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The
San Diego Defense
Lawyers Update
March, 2005
 Insurance
Law
James M.
Roth, The Roth Law Firm
In this issue we review the last cases
to have been published during 2004 and the first to be published during
2005. Overall, the decisions were favorable to the insurance industries.
See, there is a Santa Clause.
General Contractor’s Insurer Not Liable
for Equitable Contribution to Subcontractor’s Insurer When Underlying
Indemnity Provision in Subcontract Negated Indemnity For Type of Conduct
at Issue in Underlying Case.
In Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley
Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 278, the California Court of Appeal for
the Second Appellate District reversed a trial court ruling in favor of
a subcontractor’s insurer and concluded that a general contractor’s
insurer was not liable to the subcontractor’s insurer where there
existed an indemnity provision in the subcontract between the general
contractor and subcontractor which negated liability by the general
contractor to the subcontractor.
PCS was a general contractor insured
under a CGL policy issued by Mt. Hawley. PCS entered into a subcontract
with Valley Metal. The subcontract required Valley Metal to obtain a CGL
policy for itself and to include coverage for PCS as an additional
insured. Valley Metal fulfilled that obligation by purchasing a CGL
policy from Hartford. During construction, an employee of Valley Metal
(Cortez) was injured. Cortez eventually sued PCS. PCS contacted Mt.
Hawley which, in turn, tendered PCS’ defense to Hartford. Hartford
accepted the defense and informed PCS that it would indemnify PCS per
the indemnity provision in the subcontract, except for PCS’ sole
negligence or willful misconduct.
Hartford settled Cortez’s complaint and
filed a reimbursement action against Mt. Hawley. The court of appeal
reversed the trial court which had awarded Hartford onehalf of the
underlying defense and
indemnity expenses. The court
rejected Hartford’s argument that the indemnity provision in the
subcontract agreement between PCS and Valley Metal was irrelevant to the
insurers’ coverage obligations. It interpreted the indemnity provision
to mean that Valley Metal agreed to indemnify and hold PCS harmless
absent PCS’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court relied on
evidence that PCS was not solely negligent to conclude that Hartford (as
the insurer Valley Metal) could not recover from Hawley (as the insurer
for PCS).
Insured Was “Upon” Vehicle Pursuant to
Auto Liability Insurance When Insured Was Injured Rendering Aid
Passenger in Another Vehicle.
In Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ruiz
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, the California Court of Appeal for the
Sixth Appellate District affirmed the decision of the Clara County
Superior Court holding a person in proximity to a vehicle need have
occupied it in order to be deemed “upon” the vehicle for purposes of
qualifying as insured under an automobile liability policy. After a
motor vehicle accident, Ruiz (who was in the course and scope of his
employment) went check on the status of an injured passenger in another
vehicle owned by Group Manufacturing. When approaching the Group
Manufacturing vehicle, Ruiz struck by an underinsured motorist.
American States issued a commercial
policy to Ruiz’s employer. Atlantic Mutual insured Group Manufacturing
under business auto policy. Both policies provided $1 million in
underinsured motorist coverage and included the following endorsement:
We will pay all sums the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover as
compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an ‘uninsured motor
vehicle.’ The damages must result from ‘bodily injury’ sustained by the
‘insured’ caused by an ‘accident.’ The owner’s or driver’s liability for
these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the
‘uninsured motor vehicle.’
The policies defined “insured” to
include “anyone else ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’.” “Occupying” was
defined to mean “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.” The trial court
determined that Ruiz was an insured under the Atlantic Mutual policy but
not the American States policy. Ruiz and Atlantic Mutual appeal. The
appellate court affirmed. The court of appeal determined that Ruiz was
“upon” the Group Manufacturing van when he was struck by the
underinsured motorist.
It reasoned that Ruiz was positioned
immediately adjacent to the van for reasons related to the vehicle’s use
on the highway. As such, the court found that Ruiz was an insured within
the meaning of Atlantic Mutual’s underinsured motorist coverage. The
court found that Ruiz was not an insured under the American States
policy issued to his employer relying, in part, on the fact that he was
approximately 200 feet away from the employer’s vehicle when he was
struck.
Insureds Not Entitled to Prejudgment
Interest on Malicious Prosecution Damage Awards Against Insurers.
In Hillenbrand, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of
North America (2004) 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 380, the California Court of Appeal
for the Third Appellate District affirmed a decision from the Sacramento
County Superior Court, holding that insureds are not entitled to
prejudgment interest on malicious prosecution damage awards against
insurers. The court concluded that because malicious prosecution claims
against insurers are analogous to bad faith actions, any related damage
award does not constitute “damages for personal injury” for which
prejudgment interest might be recoverable under California Civil Code
section 3291.
Insured Cannot Compel Arbitration in
Uninsured Motorist Context When Insurer Pays Policy Limited to Insured.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1424, the Second District Court
of Appeal vacated the trial court’s order compelling State Farm to
arbitration on an uninsured motorist claim. State Farm’s insured was
injured in a rear-end collision. She tendered an uninsured motorist
claim to State Farm, seeking the
policy limits less a credit for
the uninsured driver’s contribution.
State Farm initially rejected the
tender, and the insured demanded arbitration. State Farm subsequently
paid the policy limits, but the insured nevertheless sought an order
compelling arbitration. She contended her damages exceeded the policy
limits, and sought to use the arbitration proceedings to evaluate a
possible bad faith suit. The court of appeal concluded the maximum award
available in an uninsured motorist arbitration is the policy limits.
However, the arbitrator could not consider whether State Farm paid in an
untimely manner or engaged in other claims handling misconduct. Since
State Farm had paid the policy limits, there was thus no controversy
left to be arbitrated.
Insurance Broker Who Knowingly Makes
False Statements on an Insurance Application May Be Held Liable to an
Insurer That Reasonably Relies on the Statements.
In Century Surety Company v. Crosby
Insurance, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 116, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in San Bernardino reversed in part and affirmed in part a
judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was entered in favor of an
insurance broker on a complaint brought by an insurer for fraud,
negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The court of appeal held an
insurance broker who knowingly makes false statements on an insurance
application may be held liable to an insurer that reasonably relies on
the statements.
The court of appeal rejected the
broker’s contentions that only the insured could be held liable for the
misrepresentations and that the insurer’s remedy was limited to
rescission of the policy. The court also concluded that, although no
California court had considered whether an insurance broker owes a duty
of care to an insurer, public policy supports imposing such a duty.
No Duty to Defend in Advertising Injury
Claim Where the Underlying Suit Included No Allegations of a Causal
Connection Between Some Form of Advertising and Plaintiff’s Alleged
Injuries.
In We Do Graphics, Inc. v. Mercury Cas.
Co. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 131, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Orange County affirmed a summary judgment in favor of an insurer. The
Court concluded the insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying
suit included no allegations of a causal connection between some form of
advertising and plaintiff ’s alleged injuries. The underlying plaintiff
alleged its former employee stole trade secrets, joined We Do Graphics,
Inc., and attempted to solicit plaintiff ’s customers. Plaintiff then
sued We Do Graphics. We Do Graphics tendered the suit to Mercury
Casualty Co., and Mercury denied coverage.
We Do Graphics sued Mercury, alleging
the underlying suit triggered advertising injury coverage. The trial
court and the court of appeal disagreed, concluding there were no
allegations in the underlying suit relating to the insured’s advertising
activities. The court of appeal concluded the alleged trade secrets were
customer information, not advertising ideas. Moreover, the only
reference to advertising was in a declaration filed by the insured in
opposition to Mercury’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded
this speculation, about extraneous facts regarding potential liability
or ways in which the plaintiff might amend its complaint, could not
trigger a duty to defend.
Attorney Barred as Expert When
Personally Involved in Providing Legal Advice and Services to Insurer in
Matters Substantially Related to the Instant Litigation.
In Brand v. 20th Century Insurance
Company (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 594, the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s denial of an insurer’s motion to exclude
expert testimony of its former attorney. Plaintiff designated the
attorney to provide
expert testimony on claims
handling issues. 20th Century Insurance Company moved for a protective
order barring the attorney from testifying against it as an expert. The
trial court denied the application, but the court of appeal reversed.
20th Century had not engaged the attorney for over twelve years.
Nevertheless, the court of appeal concluded the attorney should be
barred from testifying as an expert because he was personally involved
in providing legal advice and services to 20th Century in matters
substantially related to the instant litigation.
Carrier’s Receipt of an Initial Premium
Check and Subsequent Approval of the Policy Application Rendered the
Life Insurance Policy Effective from the Date of the Application.
In Hodgson v. Banner Life Ins. Co.,
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1358, the California Court of Appeal, Third
Appellate District, reversed the judgment of the trial court and granted
summary judgment in favor of an insured, holding that a carrier’s
receipt of an initial premium check and subsequent approval of the
policy application rendered the life insurance policy effective from the
date of the application. Hodgson completed an application for a $500,000
life insurance policy with defendant Banner Life Insurance Company
(“Banner”) and paid an initial premium. Hodgson’s application included a
“conditional receipt,” which provided interim coverage while the
application for permanent coverage was being considered. When Hodgson
applied, Banner limited interim insurance to applicants who applied for
face amounts of life insurance of $250,000 or less.
However, the broker used an old
application form indicating that the conditional receipt was effective
for limits up to $500,000. Within days, Banner returned the check for
the initial premium to Hodgson and declared the conditional receipt
ineffective. The company eventually approved coverage for Hodgson only
to find that he had died five days earlier. Oops! Banner considered the
policy terminated prior to Hodgson’s death and was sued by his
survivors. The court found that Hodgson and his survivors
could not have a reasonable
expectation that interim coverage was in place because Banner had
returned the premium payment and advised that any coverage under the
conditional receipt was terminated.
However, with respect to the permanent
insurance policy ultimately approved by Banner, the court held that
coverage was effective from the date of the application pursuant to
Insurance Code section 10115. That section provides that when an
applicant makes a premium payment concurrently with the submittal of a
life insurance application and either receives a form receipt for the
premium or the carrier receives the payment at its home office, and the
carrier later approves the application, if the applicant dies on or
after the date of the application, the “insurer shall pay such amount as
would have been due under the terms of the policy . . . as if such
policy had been issued and delivered on the date the application was
signed by the applicant.”
The court found the requirements of
section 10115 met because Hodgson submitted an application with a
premium check, the same was received at Banner’s home office, and Banner
ultimately approved the application. While many of you are not in the
life insurance industry, the case is noteworthy, and more importantly,
fills space for the column.
Carriers’ Settlement Without Consent or
Participation of Insureds Enforceable with Plaintiff When No ROR Issued.
In Fiege v. Cooke (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th
1350, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
concluded that notwithstanding the express requirement by CCP section
664.6 that to be enforceable a settlement must be either stipulated in
writing by the parties or placed upon the record before the court, a
settlement between a personal injury plaintiff and defendants’ carriers,
which had the right under the policies to settle without the defendants’
consent, was enforceable even though defendants did not stipulate in
writing to the settlement or place the settlement upon the court’s
record, since the settlement by the carriers did not prejudice the
rights of the defendants as no reservations of rights
were issued by the carriers.
A long sentence; but you get the idea.
Fiege sued several defendants, including individuals Norman Cooke and
Robert Ellis, over a traffic accident. Michael Wooldridge, the driver of
the car in which Fiege was a passenger, also sued Cooke and Ellis. After
a complaint in intervention by one of the insurance companies, a
consolidation, and a cross-complaint by Cooke and Ellis, the matter went
to a mandatory settlement conference. By this time, Fiege was on one
side; Cooke, Ellis and Wooldridge were on the other, in that Fiege was
seeking compensation from all three. The defendants were all insured
under policies that gave the carriers the right to settle without the
defendants’ consent and to bind the defendants to the settlement. One
carrier agreed to settle for $135,000 (including payment on two liens)
on behalf of Cooke and Ellis. The other agreed to pay $25,000 on behalf
of Wooldridge. The trial court secured Fiege’s oral consent to the
settlement.
The defendants were not present at the
settlement conference nor did they stipulate in writing to the
settlement. Fiege later sought to escape from the settlement. In
response, the defendants successfully moved under CCP section 664.6 to
enforce the settlement. That section provides, in part, that “[i]f
parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the
parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court,
for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may
enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” The trial court
entered a judgment consistent with the settlement terms, reasoning that
not only are the insureds rights not prejudiced but the consent of the
carriers was superfluous because the policies provided the carriers the
rights to settle without the consent of the insureds. Moving from facts
and law to reality, the court explained that: it is common practice for
insurance counsel and an adjuster to handle the negotiation of
insurance- funded settlements without the superfluous involvement of a
fully protected insured.
If Levy [the
case law relied upon by Fiege] were nevertheless interpreted to require
the superfluous signature of an insured to an insurance-funded
settlement in order for section 664.6 to apply, it is predictable that
the insured would henceforth be ordered to attend all [mandatory
settlement conferences]. Present practice often allows an insured to
avoid such expense and inconvenience by permitting counsel and the
adjuster to appear. Indeed, many people regard the ability to let the
insurance carrier handle insured incidents without inconvenience to the
insured as one of the benefits gained by purchasing insurance.
The Levy court was not
faced with an insured situation in which a literal party-signature
requirement would more likely impair the insureds interests than protect
them. Since Levy did not involve an insurance-funded settlement, we do
not read Levy as precluding enforcement pursuant to section 664.6 of an
insurance-funded settlement reached by an authorized insurance defense
counsel or adjuster when the carrier has the contractual right to
settle. The question surviving this decision is what would have happened
if any of the carriers had issued ROR’s and sought reimbursement from
the insured rather than waive the ROR? Can you say “bad faith”
litigation?
Cal-OSHA Standards Can Be
Used as Evidence.
In an important withdraw
from historically disallowing administrative findings into court, the
California Supreme Court has recently decided in Elsner v. Uveges,
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, that for injuries occurring after January 1,
2000, courts may consider Cal/OSHA safety standards as evidence of
acceptable safety practices in lawsuits brought by workers against
companies other than their own employer. The ruling reverses a law that
had been in place since 1971 Labor Code section 6304.5), which specified
use of industry custom as the safe workplace guideline in third-party
lawsuits. The
reversal upholds a key provision of Assembly Bill 1127, a controversial
2000 law aimed at increasing penalties against employers for serious
safety violations. In the case, Rowdy Elsner, an employee of Hoffman
Roofing, injured his ankle when a scaffold collapsed beneath him at a
construction site.
Carl Uveges, the general
contractor, was directly responsible for supervising work and for
enforcing safety compliance. When Elsner sued Uveges for negligence,
Uveges asked the court to exclude any references to alleged violation of
Cal- OSHA safety standards. The trial judge disagreed, and ruled Cal-OSHA
provisions admissible, a change permitted by the 2000 amendment. The
judge also refused to admit evidence that the scaffold was built
according to accepted industry standards. As a result, the jury found
the company 100 percent at fault and awarded Elsner substantial damages.
The California Supreme
Court agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion, but reversed the
decision in this case because the injury occurred prior to the effective
date of the amended law. The court said that until January 1, 2000, an
industry could rely on a custom or practice as a reasonable standard of
care, even though it did not meet Cal-OSHA safety orders. Applying the
new rules would make the company potentially responsible for conduct
that might have satisfied the prior legal standard, but not specific
Cal-OSHA standards.
A “User” of a Truck May Not Be a
“Borrower” to Qualify for Coverage under a Motor Vehicle Liability
Insurance.
In City of Los Angeles v. Allianz Ins.
Co., (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 287, the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, considered whether a shipper, who directs the
loading of a truck on its premises and is to that extent a “user” of the
truck, is also a “borrower” of the truck, and therefore an “insured”
under the provisions of a trucking company’s insurance policy. The court
concluded the shipper did not exercise the requisite dominion and
control over the truck to qualify as a borrower under the terms of the
policy. A truck driver employed by MSM Trucking was injured when he fell
during the weighing of his truck after it had been loaded with treated
sewage at a City of Los Angeles treatment facility.
After the driver sued the City, the City
sought a defense from MSM’s motor vehicle liability carriers. The City
sued the carriers after they refused to defend on the ground that the
City did not qualify as an insured. The policies covered MSM’s
“employees, partners, a lessee or borrower or any of their employees,
while moving property to or from a covered auto.” The court found that
the City was a “user” of the truck. The City argued that the same facts
establishing the City was a user of the truck — its control over the
loading process — also establish it was a borrower of the truck. The
court disagreed, finding “[o]ne can load or unload — and therefore ‘use’
— a truck one does not own and has not borrowed or hired.” According to
the court, “the pertinent question, in determining whether the City
borrowed MSM’s truck, is whether the City had ‘the requisite dominion
and control over the truck[,] not whether it directed or controlled the
loading process.’” The court found that the requisite dominion and
control was not present under the facts as the City was not in
possession or custody of the truck and did not have the use of the
truck for its own purposes, to
the exclusion of its owner.
The “Sole Negligence” of an Additional
Insured Party under a Liability Policy Will Not, in the Absence of
Contrary Policy Language, Preclude That Party from Enforcing the
Insurer’s Coverage Commitment.
In American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA v.
General Star Indem. Co. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1510, the California
Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the impact
of Civil Code § 2782(a) on the scope of an insurers’ obligations under
additional insured endorsements. Section 2782 limits the scope of
indemnity promises in construction contracts. It declares unenforceable,
as contrary to public policy, any provision purporting to indemnify a
promisee for any injury or loss “arising from the sole negligence or
willful misconduct” of the promisee. After pointing out that Section
2782 expressly states that its “sole negligence” limitation “shall not
affect the validity of any insurance contract,” the appellate court held
that “[a] provision in a liability policy providing coverage to an
additional insured will not be deemed contrary to public policy or
unenforceable merely because that additional insured party may have
incurred claim liability due to its ‘sole negligence.’
Stated another way, absent contrary
language in the policy or in the additional insured endorsement, an
indemnitee under a construction contract may enforce the commitment made
by such endorsement to provide coverage for a claim arising from the
indemnitee’s negligence even though: (1) Section 2782 would preclude
enforcement of the contractual indemnity promise made by the indemnitor;
or (2) under the facts of the case and the terms of the contract of
indemnity, the indemnitor had no obligation to provide indemnity to the
indemnitee.” The court concluded that while Section 2782 may preclude
enforcement of a promise of indemnity in a construction contract, it
does not limit the enforcement of an “additional insured” endorsement
provided to the indemnitee by the indemnitor’s liability insurer. In
addition, the court held that the provisions
of the contract of indemnity did
not preclude enforcement by the indemnitee of its claim of coverage
under the additional insured endorsement.
Insured May Assign its Right to Brandt
Fees Claim.
In Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye
House, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1569, the California Court of Appeal
for the Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order
denying attorney fees and held that an insured may assign its right,
established in Brandt v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.3d 813, to recover
as damages attorney fees incurred in obtaining the benefits of an
insurance policy that were denied as a result of the insurer’s bad
faith. The court disagreed with dictum in Xebec Development Partners,
Ltd. V. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 501, which
suggested that although an insured may assign its claims against an
insurer for bad faith, the insured cannot assign the right to recover
Brandt fees.
The court noted that the policy in
California is to favor assignability of claims and that, as a general
proposition, the only claims which are not assignable are those which
are founded upon wrongs of a purely personal nature, such as slander,
assault and battery, seduction, breach of marriage promise, malicious
prosecution, and others of like nature. The court concluded that the
right to recover policy benefits in full, which Brandt fees are designed
to accomplish, is not the kind of personal right that is not assignable.
In an Action in Which Excess Insurer Was
Added as a Defendant by Insured after Primary Insurers Had Settled,
Excess Insurer Could Not Raise Peremptorily Challenge to Trial Judge
Because Primary Insurers Had Previously Exercised the One Challenge per
Side Permitted by Statute.
In Home Ins. Co. V. Superior Court
Montrose Chemical) (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1025, the California Supreme Court
considered the question of whether, in a single action brought by the
insured against both its primary and excess insurers, the interests of
the two types of insurers must be deemed “substantially
adverse,” relegating them to
different “sides” in the litigation and entitling an after-named excess
insurer to the exercise of a separate peremptory challenge to a trial
judge pursuant to C.C.P. § 170.6. Only one such challenge is available
“per side.” The Court held that a party seeking a subsequent
disqualification of the trial judge has the burden of demonstrating that
its interests are substantially adverse to those of a co-party that
previously exercised a peremptory challenge. The Court found that the
excess insurer had not made such a showing and noted that the interests
of primary and excess insurers are not necessarily adverse so as to
place them on different “sides” of an action for purposes of a
peremptory challenge under Section 170.6.
Loss Suffered by Insured Property Owner
When Clogged Sewer Line Underneath Property Caused Water and Sewage to
Flow into Basement of Property Was Excluded from Coverage under Policy
Exclusion for “[W]ater That Backs up from a Sewer or Drain.”
In Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Mike’s
Tailoring (2005) 05 C.D.O.S. 354, the California Court of Appeal for the
Third Appellate District reversed the trial court and held that an
exclusion for damage caused by “[w]ater that backs up from a sewer or
drain” applied to preclude coverage for damage caused by sewage carried
by water because the common sense interpretation of the exclusion
includes “sewage that inevitably accompanies the water in the sewer.” A
sewer line erupted in the insured’s basement and the sewage, water, and
accompanying fumes caused damage. Penn-American filed a declaratory
relief action to determine application of its water back-up exclusion
which the trial court found did not apply because it only encompassed
damage caused by water, not damage caused by the pollutants carried by
the water. The appellate court reversed. It rejected the trial court’s
distinction between water damage and sewage damage from a broken sewer
pipe. According to the court of appeal, the plain meaning of “[w]ater
back[ed] up from a sewer or drain” included water and contaminants; “No
reasonable person would assume
that water backing up from a sewer would pure water.”
Provision in Statute Extending
Limitations Period for Insurance Claims for Damages Suffered in
Northridge Earthquake of 1994, Excluding Application of Statute Where
Case Was Settled by Insured When Represented by Counsel, Operated to Bar
Property Owner’s Second Northridge Earthquake-related Action Against
Insurer, Even Though Statute Was Enacted after Owner’s Settlement of
First Suit, and Even Though First Case Was Limited to Issue of Insurance
Deductibles.
In Israel-Curley vs. California FAIR
Plan (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 123, the California Court of Appeal for the
Second Appellate District affirmed a trial court’s order granting
summary judgment to earthquake loss insurer on the ground Code of Civil
Procedure 340.9, which extended the limitations period for lawsuits
against insurers arising out Northridge Earthquake, did not apply
plaintiff’s lawsuit due to her prior participation in a settlement of
earthquake claims.
The court held that Section did not
extend the limitation period for plaintiff’s otherwise time-barred suit
because, pursuant to Section 340.9( plaintiff had entered into a prior
settlement and general release of her earthquake claims while
represented by counsel. Case Depublication. On January 2005, the
California Supreme Court heroically denied review and withdrew from
publication the decision in Permanent General Assurance Corp. v.
Superior Court (Hernandez), (2004) 19 Cal.Rptr. 597. The Hernandez
decision had ruled that, as part of an unpleaded discrimination theory,
plaintiff could compel discovery of other vehicle theft claims after
obtaining authorizations from all insureds whose claim files were to be
produced. Having been depublished, the case is longer available for use
as legal authority. This determined inaction by the Supremes results in
a very slightly more constricted application of the Colonial Life
discovery rule of other similar claims.
James M. Roth is a shareholder in The
Roth Law Firm. Mr. Roth’s practice includes representing TPAs and
insurance carriers in coverage, SIU, extra-contractual liability, and
third party defense matters. |
